News
05 AUG - FAA change icing regulations 12 AUG - India: Loss-making airlines will face safety audits
17 AUG - Spanair MD-82 crash: no warning during takeoff with flaps and slats retracted
18 AUG - NTSB issues safety recommendations on DC-9/MD-80 takeoff warning system
24 AUG - AAIB: final report on A319 electrical network failure incident
24 AUG - EASA issues emergency AD on APU sealant of Gulfstream GIV-X and GV-SP
28 AUG - JTSB issues report on China Airlines Boeing 737-800 fuel leak and ground fire
28 AUG - JTSB issues report on Saab 340 runway excursion incident
05 AUG 2009 FAA change icing regulations [to table of contents]
The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) changed its certification standards for transport category airplanes to require either the automatic activation of ice protection systems or a method to tell pilots when they should be activated.
The new rule requires an effective way to ensure the ice protection system is activated at the proper time. The rule applies to new transport aircraft designs and significant changes to current designs that affect the safety of flight in icing conditions. There is no requirement to modify existing airplane designs, but the FAA is considering a similar rulemaking that would cover those designs.
Under the revised certification standards, new transport aircraft designs must have one of three methods to detect icing and to activate the airframe ice protection system:
* An ice detection system that automatically activates or alerts pilots to turn on the ice protection system;
* A definition of visual signs of ice buildup on a specified surface (e.g., wings) combined with an advisory system that alerts the pilots to activate the ice protection system; or
* Identification of temperature and moisture conditions conducive to airframe icing that would tip off pilots to activate the ice protection system.
The standards further require that after initial activation, the ice protection system must operate continuously, automatically turn on and off, or alert the pilots when the system should be cycled. (FAA)
Federal Register, Vol. 74, No. 147
The Indian Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) has initiated an audit of maintenance procedures of major airlines to check whether the projected losses of Rs 100,000 million this fiscal year are leading to a compromise on passenger safety. The audit will scrutinise availability of spares, timely maintenance and deployment of adequate number of engineers and technicians as well as try to capture the level of financial distress, especially situations that could endanger safety. (The Economic Times)
article
17 AUG 2009 Spanair MD-82 crash: no warning during takeoff with flaps and slats retracted [to table of contents] The Spanish accident investigation board CIAIAC has issued an interim report as result of the investigation of the Spanair MD082 accident at Madrid-Barajas. Data indicate that the take-off was performed with the flaps and slats retracted and that most probably the crew did not extend those high-lift devices for the take-off. The system designed for warning the crew of an inappropriate configuration for take-off did not activate. Based on these conclusions the CIAIAC considers that improvements should be taken in the area of design operations so that future accidents as this one can be prevented. With the interim report 7 safety recommendations are issued. One is addressed to the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), another one to the Federal Aviation Authority in the United States (FAA), four are issued both to EASA & FAA and finally there is one recommendation addressed to EASA, FAA & International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). (CIAIAC)
Interim Report A-032/2008
18 AUG 2009 NTSB issues safety recommendations on DC-9/MD-80 takeoff warning system [to table of contents] On August 20, 2008 an MD-82 crashed after takeoff from runway 36 left at Madrid Barajas International Airport, Spain. An interim accident report by the CIAIAC of Spain indicates that the leading edge slats and trailing edge flaps were not extended during takeoff. This reduced the airplane’s ability to achieve adequate aerodynamic lift. The report also indicates that no takeoff warning system (TOWS) annunciations were recorded by the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) during the takeoff roll. According to the airplane manufacturer, the TOWS should have annunciated a clear and audible aural warning when the throttles were advanced to takeoff power while the trailing edge flaps were not extended in a takeoff position. The Spanish report contained several safety recommendations. The National Transportation Safety Board immediately issued five safety recommends to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA): Require that operators of Boeing DC-9 series, MD-80 series, MD-90 series, and B-717 airplanes include items in their preflight checklists to verify that a check of the takeoff warning system is accomplished before every flight. (A-09- 67) Modify 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 25 to include a certification standard that will ensure either that 1) the takeoff warning system (TOWS) cannot be disabled by a single failure or 2) if the system fails or has power removed while the airplane is operating on the ground, a discrete and clear annunciation of the loss of TOWS protection is provided to flight crews. (A-09-68) Assess the history of pilot errors related to takeoff configuration and identify needed mitigating design elements; require inclusion of such design elements when determining current and future aircraft certifications. (A- 09-69) Convene a meeting of industry, research, and government authorities, including international representatives, to develop guidance on industry best practices in operational areas (including checklist design, training, and procedures) that relate to flight crews properly configuring airplanes for takeoff and landing. (A-09-70) Require operators to modify their takeoff and landing checklists to reflect the best practices identified as a result of the meeting recommended in Safety Recommendation A-09-70. (A-09-71) (NTSB)
NTSB Safety Recommendations A 09-67/71
24 AUG 2009 AAIB: final report on A319 electrical network failure incident [to table of contents] The U.K. AAIB released the final investigation report into the serious incident involving an Airbus A319-111 aircraft operating a scheduled passenger flight between Alicante, Spain and Bristol, UK. The aircraft had experienced a fault affecting the No 1 (left) electrical generator on the previous flight and was dispatched on the incident flight with this generator selected off and the APU generator supplying power to the left electrical network. While in the cruise at FL320 in day VMC, with the autopilot and autothrust systems engaged, a failure of the electrical system occurred which caused numerous aircraft systems to become degraded or inoperative. The aircraft could only be flown manually, all the aircraft's radios became inoperative and the Captain's electronic flight instrument displays blanked. Attempts by the flight crew to reconfigure the electrical system proved ineffective and the aircraft systems remained in a significantly degraded condition for the remainder of the flight. The flight crew were unable to contact ATC for the rest of the flight. The aircraft landed uneventfully at Bristol, with the radios and several other systems still inoperative. (AAIB)
AAIB Report 4/2009
24 AUG 2009 EASA issues emergency AD on APU sealant of Gulfstream GIV-X and GV-SP [to table of contents] EASA issued an Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) following reports from Gulfstream Aerospace that an improper, flammable sealant has been used on the exterior of the APU enclosure (firewall) on G-IV, GIV-X, GV, and GV-SP aeroplanes. This condition, if not corrected, and under certain conditions such as an APU failure or an APU compartment fire, could lead to ignition of the exterior surfaces of the APU enclosure, possibly resulting in propagation of an uncontained fire to other critical areas of the aeroplane. The AD concerns aircraft with specific serial numbers and calls for a one-time inspection for sealant applied to the exterior of the APU enclosure, and, depending on findings, a revision of the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to prohibit operation of the APU during certain ground and flight operations. (EASA)
EASA EAD 2009-0180-E
28 AUG 2009 JTSB issues report on China Airlines Boeing 737-800 fuel leak and ground fire [to table of contents] On August 20, 2007, a Boeing 737-800 operated by China Airlines took off from Taiwan-Taoyuan International Airport on a flight to Naha Airport, Japan. At about 10:33, immediately after the aircraft stopped, fuel that was leaking from the fuel tank on the right wing caught fire and the aircraft was engulfed in flames. Everyone on board was evacuated from the aircraft and there were no dead and wounded. The aircraft was destroyed by fire. The Japan Transport Safety Board concluded: "It is considered highly probable that this accident occurred through the following causal chain: When the Aircraft retracted the slats after landing at Naha Airport, the track can that housed the inboard main track of the No. 5 slat on the right wing was punctured, creating a hole. Fuel leaked out through the hole, reaching the outside of the wing. A fire started when the leaked fuel came into contact with high-temperature areas on the right engine after the Aircraft stopped in its assigned spot, and the Aircraft burned out after several explosions. With regard to the cause of the puncture in the track can, it is certain that the downstop assembly having detached from the aft end of the above-mentioned inboard main track fell off into the track can, and when the slat was retracted, the assembly was pressed by the track against the track can and punctured it. With regard to the cause of the detachment of the downstop assembly, it is considered highly probable that during the maintenance works for preventing the nut from loosening, which the Company carried out on the downstop assembly about one and a half months prior to the accident based on the Service Letter from the manufacturer of the Aircraft, the washer on the nut side of the assembly fell off, following which the downstop on the nut side of the assembly fell off and then the downstop assembly eventually fell off the track. It is considered highly probable that a factor contributing to the detachment of the downstop assembly was the design of the downstop assembly, which was unable to prevent the assembly from falling off if the washer is not installed. With regard to the detachment of the washer, it is considered probable that the following factors contributed to this: Despite the fact that the nut was in a location difficult to access during the maintenance works, neither the manufacturer of the Aircraft nor the Company had paid sufficient attention to this when preparing the Service Letter and Engineering Order job card, respectively. Also, neither the maintenance operator nor the job supervisor reported the difficulty of the job to the one who had ordered the job." (JTSB)
AA2009-7
28 AUG 2009 JTSB issues report on Saab 340 runway excursion incident [to table of contents] On December 18, 2007, at about 11:26, a Saab 340B, registered JA001C, operated by Japan Air Commuter as Flight 2345, ran off runway 25 at Izumo Airport toward the right (north) in the landing roll and continued running further while veering to the right before coming to a stop on the apron. There were 37 persons on board. No one was injured in the serious incident. The aircraft was slightly damaged, and there was no outbreak of fire. The JTSB concluded: "It is considered highly probable that this serious incident occurred through the following causal chain: While the left propeller of the Aircraft was brought to the coarsen pitch almost simultaneously with touchdown causing the Aircraft to veer to the right during its subsequent landing roll, no necessary procedures were taken to stop the veering and furthermore to recover the directional control, which resulted in the Aircraft deviating from the runway, the nose gear being broken, and eventually the Aircraft being unable to ground roll for itself. With regard to the left propeller having been brought to the coarsen pitch, it is considered highly probable that the power lever operations that were performed prior to touchdown caused the autocoarsen to be activated. It is considered highly probable that the nose gear was broken when it hit the ditch that runs parallel to the runway." (JTSB)
AI2009-6
